rintod (also circulating as toolol) is a 330-byte file uploader — the smallest tool in the entire corpus. Attributed to the Indonesian scene and hosted openly on a public GitHub repository (rintod/toolol), it contains a single form field for file selection and a single handler that writes the uploaded file to the current directory. No UI to speak of, no authentication, no file-type validation. At 17/62 on VirusTotal, it is well-known to the security industry — the opposite of the exclusive, undetected tools that dominate the rest of this collection.
Capabilities
A single form field for file selection and a single handler that writes the uploaded file to the current directory. No authentication, no file-type validation, no size limits. At 330 bytes, there is literally no room for a hidden function — the entire file is the upload form and the file-write handler. This gives the analyzed sample the lowest observed supply-chain risk in the corpus — no beacon, obfuscation, or hidden branch (which cannot, of course, vouch for forks or modified copies circulating elsewhere). An operator who deploys this sample gets exactly what they see: an uploader and nothing else.
That cleanliness is precisely why rintod matters in the broader ecosystem. It is used by the Flash-X toolkit as a stage-0 dropper: after achieving initial code execution on a target, the attacker plants rintod first (small enough to inject via a one-liner), then uses it to upload the real payload — a full-featured webshell, a config grabber, or a more capable tool. Rintod is the beachhead that enables everything that follows. Its simplicity is a feature: it is too small to trigger behavioral heuristics, too generic to signature reliably, and too clean to carry collateral risk.
Vulnerabilities
| # | Class | Impact | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Unauthenticated arbitrary file upload — no filtering, no validation | Full filesystem write | Confirmed |
The contrast with Flash-X uploaders — which are only slightly larger at 1.7 KB but contain hidden mail() beacons, half-broken obfuscation, and dual-author identity leaks — illustrates the full spectrum of supply-chain trust in the T4 uploader tier. Rintod is honest. Flash-X backdoors the operator. The corpus shows that even at the simplest tier, the question of whether a tool does what it claims is never guaranteed.
Detection Surface
File-system indicators
| Indicator | Type | Detail |
|---|---|---|
move_uploaded_file | Function | Single file upload handler |
multipart/form-data | String | Upload form |
| No backdoor, no auth, no obfuscation | Clean | Lowest observed supply-chain risk in corpus (analyzed sample) |
| VT: 17/62 | Detection | Well-known, heavily detected |
| Expected size 330 bytes | Size | Smallest tool in corpus |
HTTP access-log indicators
| Log pattern | What it means |
|---|---|
multipart/form-data form with single file input | Minimal uploader form — 330 bytes total |
move_uploaded_file | Direct file write, no validation |
| Response body under 500 bytes | Smallest tool in corpus |
YARA rule
rule tool_rintod_uploader {
meta:
description = "rintod/toolol minimal uploader (330 bytes)"
author = "OHIIHO Threat Research"
reference = "https://research.ohiiho.com/arsenal/rintod/"
strings:
$upload = "move_uploaded_file" ascii
$tmp_name = "$_FILES" ascii
$form = "multipart/form-data" ascii
$input = "<input" ascii nocase
condition:
filesize < 1KB
and $upload
and $tmp_name
and ($form or $input)
}
Note: this rule is broad by design — the filesize < 1KB constraint is the primary FP reducer. Legitimate minimal upload forms may match; correlate with deployment context (e.g., file appearing in a webroot without version control history).
MITRE ATT&CK
| Technique | Context |
|---|---|
| T1505.003 | Web Shell (unauthenticated file upload) |
OHIIHO Threat Research.
